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Oakley: Oakley: Promises of Confidentiality

Promises of Confidentiality: Do Reporters

Really Have to Keep Their Word?
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.'
I. INTRODUCTION

In an industry in which information is the ultimate commodity, a new
dilemma that confronts the media world is whether the First Amendment
protects news gatherers from sources who try to enforce promises of
confidentiality. The debate raised in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.2 pits the
First Amendment freedoms of the press and speech against concepts of
contracts and torts that are deeply rooted in our legal heritage. By upholding
the media's liability to its sources, the United States Supreme Court's opinion
in Cohen could have a great impact upon the way reporters gather news and
methods of news publication. The decision will propel contract issues such
as offer, acceptance and consideration into the ivory tower of editorial
journalism. Consequently, the authority of a reporter to make promises of
confidentiality will surely be reviewed and curtailed.
The controversy surrounding the Cohen case centers on the importance
society attaches to the press. The Supreme Court of the United States has
identified three principal roles played by the press in the American "constitu-

1. 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
2. The Minnesota Law Review first broached the issues discussed here. See
Michael Dicke, Note, Promises and the Press: FirstAmendment Limitations on News
Source Recovery for Breach of a ConfidentialityAgreement, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1553
(1989) (analyzing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990), rev'd,
111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991)).
3. See Linda P. Campbell, PapersLose Appeal on Source Confidentiality, CHI.
TRIB., June 25, 1991, §1, at 2; Bernard James,JusticesStill Seeking a Consistent Voice
on FirstAmendment, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 19, 1991, at S4; Karl Olson & Benjamin A.
Holden, An Oath of Silence, THE RECORDER, Oct. 14, 1991, at 8; Albert Scardino,
Newspaper in New Case Over Naming Source, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1988, §1, at 6.
For other cases involving breaches of confidentiality agreements since the Cohen
cases, see Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991);
Morgan v. Celender, 780 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Pa. 1992); O'Connell v. Housatonic
Valley Publishing Co., No. 0055284, 1991 Conn. LEXIS 2749 (Super. Ct. Nov. 27,
1991)(court rejects Cohen analysis and embraces that in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)); Strong Memorial Hosp. v. Gannett Co. Inc., 573
N.Y.S.2d 828 (1991)(newspaper breaks confidentiality promise to AIDS patient whom
it photographed); Doe v. ABC, 543 N.Y.S.2d 455 (App. Div. 1989).
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tional scheme."4 First, the press serves as a vehicle for individual expression,
one of the personal rights protected by the First Amendment. 5 Second, the
media plays a role in "informing and educating the public, offering criticism,
and providing a forum for discussion and debate."6 Each form of expression
is guaranteed under the First Amendment. According to the theory of selfgovernment, the press provides the members of the public with information
they need to exercise democratic rights.7 Therefore, the press is protected as
an integral institution of democracy. Third, the press performs a watchdog
role by assuring that the government is accountable to the people.' The role
of the press as a check on government is also an outgrowth of the selfgovernment theory; however, it focuses on the press as a guarantor of people's
rights and not on the content of the information conveyed. 9
When reporters exercise their roles as members of the press, they often
make promises of confidentiality to sources to secure information for
publication that might otherwise be unattainable.10 The reliability of these
promises rests in the professional ethics expected of reporters, editors, and the
media in general." Most journalists consider promises of confidentiality
sacred and will risk going to jail to protect a source; however, there may be
circumstances that warrant revealing a source."

4. Dicke, supra note 2, at 1558.
5. Note, The Right of the Public and the Pressto GatherInformation, 87 HARV.
L. REv. 1505, 1507-16 (1974).

6. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781 (1978) (citing
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966)).
7. See Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction-IsFreedom ofthe Pressa Redundancy:
What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 653 (1975).
8. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966).
9. See Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1443-44 (1991); Mills, 384 U.S. at
219; Justice William J. Brennan, Address at S.I. Newhouse Center for Law & Justice
(Oct. 17, 1979), in 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 176-77 (1979).
10. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990), rev'd,
11 S.Ct. 578 (1991).
11. Id. at 202.
12. Id. Circumstances that may warrant revealing a source include:
(1) where disclosure is required to correct misstatements made by the
source and (2) where failure to reveal the source may subject the newspaper
to substantial libel damages. As an example of the first instance, the
authors cite Oliver North's public hearing testimony that the leaking of
information about the Achille Lauro hijacking seriously compromised
intelligence activities, whereupon Newsweek disclosed that North himself
was the anonymous source of the leak. In some civil libel actions, says the
article, where the reporter refuses to reveal his or her confidential source of
allegedly defamatory information, the court has threatened to enter a default
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At least two reasons make promises of confidentiality important to the
newsgathering profession.13 First, breaking a promise of confidentiality that
has induced a source to provide information is dishonorable. 4 Second,
sources may disappear if it becomes known that the promises will not be6
kept. 15 The media's professional ethics have generally protected sources;
however, journalists have recently begun to disregard these promises when
7
they believe the public has a right to know the confidential information.'
II. THE FACTS
Petitioner Dan Cohen sought a ruling from the Supreme Court that the
First Amendment does not prohibit a plaintiff from recovering damages, under
a state law theory of promissory estoppel, for breach of a promise of
confidentiality.' 8 The case arose after reporters of the St. PaulPioneerPress
Dispatch and the Minneapolis Star and Tribune 9 had given Cohen a promise
of confidentiality and had subsequently breached it. 20
During the closing days of the 1982 Minnesota gubernatorial race,
Cohen 2' approached reporters from the St. Paul PioneerPress Dispatch and
the Minneapolis Star and Tribune and offered to provide documents relating
to a candidate in the upcoming election. 22 Cohen insisted on a promise of
After both
confidentiality before he would provide the information
reporters promised to keep Cohen's identity anonymous,24 Cohen turned over
judgment against the defendant newspaper, thereby exposing the newspaper
to heavy damages.
Id. at 202 n.4 (citing Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Broken Promises, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. July/Aug. 1988, at 21) (citations omitted).
13. Id. at 202.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 202-03.
16. Id.

17. Langley & Levine, supra note 12, at 21.
18. Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2515.
19. The St. PaulPioneerPressDispatch is published by respondent Northwest

Publications, Inc., and the MinneapolisStar is published by respondent Cowles Media
Co.
20. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2516.

21. Cohen was an active Republican associated with Wheelock Whitney's
Independent Republican gubernatorial campaign. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. Cohen testified at trial that "he insisted on anonymity because he feared

retaliation from the news media and politicians." Cohen, -457 N.W.2d at 200.
24. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2516. Neither reporter told Cohen that their promises
of confidentiality were subject to their editors' approval. Both intended- to keep
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copies of two public court records concerning Marline Johnson, the Democratic-Farmer-Labor candidate for Lieutenant Governor.25 The records concerned
charges of unlawful assembly, which were later dismissed, and a conviction
for petit theft, which was later vacated.26
The two newspapers independently decided to publish Cohen's name as
part of their stories concerning Johnson.
The decision to identify Cohen
was based on three reasons common to both newspapers. 28 Editors argued
that (1) Cohen's identification as the source of the Johnson story was
newsworthy;29 (2) to attribute the information to an anonymous source would
be "misleading and cast doubt on others; 30 and (3) the Johnson story was
becoming known among the news media and was discoverable from sources
not bound by confidentiality.31

Cohen's identity anonymous as promised. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 200.
25. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 200.
26. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2516. The first court record indicated that Johnson had
been charged in 1969 with three counts of unlawful assembly, and the second that she
had been convicted in 1970 of petit theft. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 200. Both
newspapers interviewed Johnson for her explanation, and one reporter tracked down
the person who had found the records for Cohen. Id. at 201. As it turned out, the
unlawful assembly charges arose out of Johnson's participation in a protest of an
alleged failure to hire minority workers on municipal construction projects, and the
charges were eventually dismissed. Id. at 201 n.2. The petit theft conviction was for
leaving a store without paying for $6.00 worth of sewing materials. Id. The incident
apparently occurred at a time during which Johnson was emotionally distraught, and
the conviction was later vacated. Id.
27. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2516 ("In their stories, both papers identified Cohen as
the source of the court records, indicated his connection to the Whitney campaign, and
included denials by Whitney campaign officials of any role in the matter.").
Cohen had also contacted the Associated Press and WCCO-TV. The Associated
Press reported the story without divulging the source. WCCO-TV decided not to
broadcast the news because the last-minute leak seemed unfair to Johnson. David G.
Savage, Media Must Keep Promiseto Sources, JusticesRule; Press: CourtSays News
OrganizationsCanBe ForcedTo PayDamagesIfIt ViolatesPledge of Confidentiality,
L.A. TIMES, June 25, 1991, at Al.
28. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 201.
29. Id. Cohen was a newsworthy and public figure. He had been active in
politics for years as a campaign worker, candidate, and elected public official. He was
a Whitney supporter in'1982 and was employed by an advertising firm which handled
some work for the Whitney campaign. He had also worked as a lawyer, stock broker,
,public relations official, author, and freelance newspaper columnist. Id. at 201 n.3.
30. Id. at 201.
31. Id.
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Cohen was fired by his employer the day the stories appeared. 32
Thereafter, he sued the publishers in Minnesota state court, alleging fraudulent
misrepresentation and breach of contract. 33 The trial court rejected the
publishers' argument that the First Amendment barred Cohen's lawsuit.' A
jury returned a verdict in Cohen's favor, awarding him $200,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages3 5
The Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that Cohen did not establish
a fraud claim,' the only claim that could support an award of punitive
damages.37 The court of appeals, therefore, reversed the award of punitive
damages. 38 The court affirmed the trial court's $200,000 compensatory
damage award for breach of contract.39
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the compensatory damages
award. 40 The court considered Cohen's breach of contract claim and
concluded that "'a contract cause of action is inappropriate for these
circumstances' "41 despite the apparent existence of an offer, acceptance and
consideration. 2 The court concluded that the special relationship shared by
reporters and their news sources does not normally involve an intent to make

32. Id. at 202.
33. Id. Cohen could not sue for defamation because the information published
was true. Id.
34. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2516.
35. Id.

36. The claim of fraudulent misrepresentation failed because "[t]o be actionable,
a misrepresentation must misrepresent a present or past fact." Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 259 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), affid in part, 457 N.W.2d 199
(Minn. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991). Future nonperformance does not mean
there was misrepresentation at the inception of the contract, unless when entering into
the contract the party never intended to perform the contract. Id. Cohen concedes that
the reporters intended to keep the promises. Id. The record also shows that the editors
intended to keep the promises until more information was obtained and the matter was
discussed with the other editors. Id. at 260. The court of appeals also found that the
reporters did not mislead Cohen by concealing the fact that only editors had the
authority to promise confidentiality. Id. The reporters did not know of the policy and
thought they as reporters had the necessary authority to make promises of confidentiality. Id. at 259-60.
37. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2516.
38. Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 260.
39. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2516.
40. Id. (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990), rev'd,
111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991)).
41. Id. at 2516-17 (quoting Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 203).
42. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 202.
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a legally binding contract.43 The parties expect that promises of confidentiality impose a moral and ethical obligation, which is not necessarily coextensive
with legally binding obligations." The court also found the application of
contract theory
to promises of confidentiality impractical in daily
45
newsgathering.
The court then addressed the question of whether Cohen could establish
46
a cause of action under Minnesota law on a promissory estoppel theory.
Apparently, a promissory estoppel theory was never tried to the jury, nor
briefed or argued to the lower courts by the parties. The theory first arose
during oral arguments in the Minnesota Supreme
Court when one of the
47
justices asked a question about equitable estoppel.
The court decided that the most problematic element in establishing a
promissory estoppel cause of action here was whether injuries could be
avoided only by enforcing the promise of confidentiality made to Cohen.48
The court stated that
[u]nder a promissory estoppel analysis there can be no neutrality towards
the First Amendment. In deciding whether it would be unjust not to
enforce the promise, the court must necessarily weigh the same considerations that are weighed for whether the First Amendment has been violated.
The court must balance the constitutional rights of a free press
against the
49
common law interest in protecting a promise of anonymity.

43. Id. at 203.
44. Id.
45. Id. The court stated:
The source, for whatever reasons, wants certain information published. The
reporter can only evaluate the information after receiving it, which is after
the promise is given; and the editor can only make a reasonable, informed
judgment after the information received is put in the larger context of the
news. The durability and duration of the confidence is usually left unsaid,
dependent on unfolding developments; and none of the parties can safely
predict the consequences of publication .... Each party, we think, assumes
the risks of what might happen, protected only by the good faith of the
other party.
Id.
46. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2517. Under promissory estoppel a contract in law is
implied where one does not exist in fact. "[A] promise expected or reasonably
expected to induce definite action by the promisee that does induce action is binding
if injustice can be avoided only be enforcing the promise." Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at
203-04.
47. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2517.
48. Id.
49. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 205.
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The court reasoned that applying promissory estoppel to Cohen would
mean "second-guessing the newspaper editors."50 The court recognized that
the choice of editorial material is at the heart of First Amendment rights of a
free press.5 ' Enforcing civil judgments against the press for breaching
promises of confidentiality could chill public debate about politics, which is
crucial to a democratic society.52 The court concluded that "in this case
enforcement of the promise of confidentiality under a promissory
estoppel
53
theory would violate defendants' First Amendment rights.,
In granting certiorari upon Cohen's petition, the Supreme Court of the
United States considered only the First Amendment implications of enforcing
a promise of confidentiality against the press.5 4 In an opinion delivered by
Justice White,55 the Court held that the First Amendment does not bar a
promissory estoppel cause of action against the press5 6
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In the Cohen case, the Supreme Court sought to provide redress for the
plaintiff's injury caused by the breach of the promise of confidentiality while
protecting the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press. The
tension between these conflicting goals is especially sharp because the First
Amendment freedoms and the freedom to contract are both cornerstones of the
political, socio-economic, and legal heritage of the United States.
Before evaluating the media's constitutional rights, one must determine
whether a private cause of action for promissory estoppel involves state action
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. If not, the issue of
whether the First Amendment protects the speech in Cohen is never reached
because constitutional rights would not attach.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,57 the Court held that "the application
of state rules of law in state courts [between private parties] in a manner
alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes 'state action' under

50. Id.
51. Id. (citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258
(1974)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2517.
55. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Stevens, Scalia and Kennedy joined. Justice
Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Marshall and Souter joined.
Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun and
O'Connor joined.
56. Id. at 2519.
57. 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
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the Fourteenth Amendment." ' That rule of law was reiterated in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps 9 when a newspaper was sued for defamation
for articles it published linking a beer producer to organized crime. 60
Therefore, state efforts to handicap newsgathering and publishing constitute
state action.
The second, more complex issue is the extent to which the First
Amendment provides the defendant publishers any protection. The complexity
of this issue is demonstrated by the widely divergent case law cited by the
parties in Cohen. The defendants relied on a string of Supreme Court cases
subordinating the state's interests to the press' need to publish truthful
information.6 ' In contrast, the plaintiff and the majority focused on case law
subjecting the press to generally applicable laws despite incidental effects on
the ability to gather and report the news. 62 An analysis of both approaches
shows that the result is dependent on the balance of the First Amendment with
the state's interests.
A. FirstAmendment Protection of the Press
In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,63 the United States Supreme
Court held that "[i]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about
a matter of public significance, then state officials may not constitutionally
punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest
of the highest order."" 4 In Smith, the Court would not subject a newspaper
to criminal sanctions for publishing a juvenile offender's name the paper had
lawfully obtained, although publication violated a state statute. 65 The state
interest of protecting the juvenile did not outweigh First and Fourteenth
Amendment freedoms.6

58. Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2517 (citing New York Times, 376 U.S. at 265).
59. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
60. Id. at 776-77.
61. The Court noted, "If a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about
a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest
order." Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518 (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S.
97, 103 (1979)). See also Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
62. Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2518.
63. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
64. Id. at 103.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 105-06.
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The ruling in Smith followed a similar conclusion in Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,67 in which a newspaper violated a state
statute by publishing an article divulging information about a state inquiry into
the misconduct of a judge.'
The Court refused to encroach upon First
Amendment rights to enforce the statute.69
In Florida Star v. BJ.F.,0 the Court held that the state could not
impose criminal liability on a newspaper for publishing the name of a victim
of a sex offense in violation of a state statute. 1 Imposition of liability would
violate the First Amendment and would not further a "state interest of the
highest order."'
All three cases involved a state imposing criminal liability on a
newspaper for publishing lawfully obtained information in violation of a state
statute which specifically forbade publication.7 3 Cohen sought to impose
civil liability because the published information was not obtained lawfully.7 4
He argued that the defendants' acts were illegal because they breached their
promise of confidentiality given in exchange for the information. 7S The
Court agreed with Cohen, holding that the breach of promise propels the
analysis into another line of cases subjecting the press to generally applicable
laws.76
B. Laws of GeneralApplicability
Generally applicable laws "do not offend the First Amendment simply
because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability
to gather and report the news."'
Cases decided under this doctrine reflect
a desire to subject the press to laws as applied to any other person or
organization.78 By definition, laws of general applicability do not single out
the press. 79 Therefore, the laws do not relate to the publication of informa-

67. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
68. Id. at 831. The information was printed prior to the investigatory hearing.
Id. at 831-32.
69. Id. at 843-44.
70. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
71. Id. at 532-33.
72. Id.
73. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
74. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2516.
75. Id. at 2519.
76. Id. at 2518.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2518-19.
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tion, in contrast to the statutes in the First Amendment line of cases that
specifically forbade the publication of certain information. 80
In Associated Press v. NLRB, 81 the Court held that the National Labor
Relations Act could be enforced against the defendant publisher without
violating its First Amendment freedoms."
The Associated Press had
transferred information via telephone and telegraph; therefore, the Court found
that Associated Press was engaged in interstate commerce. 83 As a consequence, the Court held the National Labor Relations Board could require
employees of Associated Press to be returned to employment and compensated
for lost wages after they had been discharged for union activities.8
Associated Press claimed unsuccessfully that the First Amendment
freedoms of press and speech would be violated by enforcement of the Act
because federal jurisdiction over the defendant's employees was based on
Congress' authority to regulate "the gathering, production, and dissemination
of news for the American press."5 Associated Press argued that to treat the
news as "ordinary articles of commerce, subject to federal supervision and
control" amounted to a violation of the freedoms of speech and the press."
The defendant argued the enforcement of the Act eliminated the freedom of
the press by allowing a federal bureau to "dictate" whom the press must
employ. 7
The Court in Associated Press rejected the defendant's claim of a First
Amendment violation as irrelevant and "unsound."m The majority held that
the Act does not interfere with the employment practices by the press unless
employees are discharged for union activity or request collective bargaining.89 These reasons are unrelated to newsgathering and dissemination.
Because the effects on publication appeared incidental at best, the Court found
that the act could be applied to the press. 90
In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,9' the Court held that the
Fair Labor Standards Act applies to the press. 92 The Fair Labor Relations

80. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
81. 301 U.S. 103 (1937).

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 132-33.
Id. at 127-28.
Id.
Id. at 115-16.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 131-32.
327 U.S. 186 (1946).
Id. at 192-93.
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Board had requested a newspaper's employment and business records by
subpoena pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act. 93 The newspaper
claimed unsuccessfully that the application of the Act to newspapers would
violate their First Amendment rights by regulating their press activities. 94
The Court held that protecting employees from unfair employment practices
was not regulation of newsgathering and dissemination. 95
In Branzburg v. Hayes,96 the Court held that the First Amendment does
not relieve reporters from responding to a grand jury subpoena and answering
relevant questions in a criminal investigation.97 The Court subordinated the
concern that the reporter might reveal a confidential source to the policy
concern for enforcement of subpoenas. 9s
In Zacchini v. Scripps-HowardBroadcastingCo.,99 the Court held that
the press may not publish copyrighted material without obeying the copyright
laws.0 The plaintiff, an entertainer, alleged that a broadcast company
misappropriated the plaintiff's right of publicity when the company televised
a videotape of the entertainer's act on a news program without his consent.101 The Court held that "[t]he Constitution no more prevents a State
from requiring respondent to compensate petitioner [entertainer] for broadcasting his act on television than it would privilege respondent [broadcaster] to
film and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the
copyright owner."'0 2
The Supreme Court has also rejected claims of First Amendment
protection from antitrust laws0 3 and payment of nondiscriminatory taxes.104

93. Id. at 189.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 192-93.
Id.
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Id. at 692.
Id. at 693.

99. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).

100. Id. at 575.
101. Id. at 563-64.
102. Id. at 575.
103. Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20, n.18 (1945).
104. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581-83 (1983).
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C. Balance of Interests
Justice Souter's dissent in Cohen raises another line of cases that
emphasizes the balance of interests in favor of the "right to know." 10 5 I n
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,l the Court held that the First
Amendment protection is not limited to the expression of the press and
individuals.'0 7 The First Amendment also prohibits limiting the stock of
information from which members of the public may draw.'0 The Court
placed a higher and broader value on the right of the public to know than on
the right of the media or an individual to publish.10' The information the
press provides enables members of the public to make intelligent and informed
decisions on public matters. 10
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
In deciding Cohen, the majority focused on the issue of whether the First
Amendment prohibits a plaintiff from recovering damages under state
promissory estoppel law for a newspaper's breach of a promise of confidenti111 The Court held that
ality given to a plaintiff in exchange for information.
112
the First Amendment does not prohibit recovery.
The defendants first asserted that the Court lacked jurisdiction to
determine the validity of a promissory estoppel theory because it is entirely
a matter of state law interpretation. 1 The Court rejected their contention
because (1) the Minnesota Supreme Court based its holding on the conclusion
that such a theory would violate the First Amendment and (2) the defendants
defended themselves throughout the suit by contending the First Amendment
bars a promissory estoppel cause of action against the press. 14 The Court

105. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2522-23.
106. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
107. Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2523; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783.
108. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783. See also Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic
Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989).
109. CBS, Inc. v FCC,'453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981).
110. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,492 (1975). See supra notes
4-9 and accompanying text.
111. Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2516.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2517.
114. Id.
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has jurisdiction to hear state law claims that raise federal constitutional
questions and defenses." 5
After establishing jurisdiction, the Court decided "whether a private cause
of action for promissory estoppel involves 'state action' within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment such that the protections of the First Amendment are triggered."'1 6 Referring to the Court's analysis in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,"" the majority determined that the enforcement of a
successful promissory estoppel suit by the court would restrict First Amendment freedoms of the defendants under the auspices of state courts."" This
involvement constitutes "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment." 9
After determining the presence of state action, the Court addressed
120
whether the state action violates the defendants' First Amendment rights.
The Court balanced the constitutional rights of a free press' 2 ' against the
enforcement of laws of general applicability. 22
The Court began by rejecting the line of cases proffered by the
defendants'23 that protects the press from punishment if the information
published is obtained lawfully and involves a matter of public significance. 24 The Court concluded that because the information published in
Cohen was obtained by breaching a promise of confidentiality, the information
was not obtained lawfully, and its publication was not protected by the
Constitution. 25
The Court relied on the line of cases"5 that hold that "generally
applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their
enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and
report the news."' 27 The Court concluded that the doctrine of promissory

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.

118. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518. Cohen was remanded to the Minnesota Supreme
Court to determine the validity of a promissory estoppel claim; therefore, Minnesota

courts would be enforcing any judgment rendered against the defendants. Id. at 251920.
119. Id. at 2518.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See supra notes 77-104.
See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518.
Id. at 2519.
See supra notes 77-104 and accompanying text.
Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518.
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estoppel is a law of general applicability. 12 Therefore, if general laws apply
to the press and the effect on the press is only incidental, the First Amendment does not forbid their application to the defendants in Cohen."9
The Court stressed that the application of promissory estoppel does not
31
single out the press. 3 ' In responding to Justice Blackmun's dissent,
Justice White wrote that the enforcement of a promissory estoppel action
would not punish the press because compensatory damages are not a form of
punishment. 3 1 Justice White equated the damages with liquidated damages
pursuant to a contract provision or a "generous bonus" to a confidential
source.'33 Both represent the "cost of acquiring newsworthy material to be
published at a profit, rather than a punishment imposed by the State."' 34 In
Cohen, any restrictions on publication were self-imposed because they were
created when the defendants breached their promises to the plaintiff.3 5 The
state is merely requiring that those making promises must keep them or must
compensate the other party for their breach.'3
Finally, the Court rejected Cohen's request that the jury verdict be
reinstated, awarding him $200,000 in compensatory damages.'3 7 The Court
remanded to the Minnesota Supreme Court to determine whether a promissory
estoppel claim had been established and whether Minnesota state law might
protect the press from that claim."3 The Minnesota Supreme Court held

128. Id. at 2518-19.

129. Id. at 2519.
130. Id. "[E]nforcement of such general laws against the press is not subject to
stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other persons or
organizations .... It does not target or single out the press." Id. See supra notes 63-

104 for a discussion of laws which do violate the First Amendment right of the press
in contrast to laws of general applicability.
131. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2520-22.

132. Id. at 2519. Justice White distinguished the case at hand with Blackmun's
analysis of Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. See supra notes 63-66.

133. Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2519.
134. Id.
135. Id. The majority distinguished FloridaStar v. BJ.F.when they found that
breaching the promise to Cohen disqualified the defendants for First Amendment
protection for lawfully obtained information. Id. FloridaStar is discussed supra text
accompanying notes 70-72.
136. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2520. On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that (1)plaintiff
may pursue a theory of promissory estoppel on appeal, although he started with a
contract theory at trial, under these circumstances; (2) Minnesota's free speech clause
does not afford greater protection to a confidentiality promise in this case than is
afforded under the First Amendment, nor does enforcement of this confidentiality
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that damages for breach of the promise were sustainable under promissory
estoppel." 9
40

B. Justice Blackmun's Dissent1
In contrast to the majority, Justice Blackmun embraced the line of First
14
Amendment cases typified by Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co..
' He

concluded that using a promissory estoppel claim to penalize publication of
truthful information about a political campaign violates the First Amendment. 42
Justice Blackmun rejected the argument for enforcement of generally
applicable laws, 143 because he concluded the analysis should focus on the
speech and not the speaker.'" Constitutional freedoms of speech and press
are not restricted to the media but apply to non-media defendants equally.' 45
Therefore, the majority's reliance on the cases that
supported the general
146
applicability of laws to publishers was "misplaced."'
Justice Blackmun specifically distinguished the majority's line of cases.
He pointed out that in the majority's line of cases the Court imposed liability
on media defendants for conduct unrelated to the content of speech. 47 In
contrast, the promise in Cohen was related to speech, because publication
triggered the breach of the confidentiality promise that led to liability.' 48

promise violate public policy; (3) the jury award of compensatory damages for breach
of a confidentiality promise is sustainable on the theory of promissory estoppel.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 -N.W.2d 387, 390-92 (Minn. 1992).
139. Cohen, 497 N.W.2d at 388.
140. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2520. Blackmun is joined by Justice Marshall and
Justice Souter. Id.
141. 443 U.S. 97 (1979). See supra notes 63-66.
142. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2520.
143. Justice Blackmun did not reject the validity of the cases holding the general
applicability of laws; however, he decided they did not control in Cohen. In fact,
Justice Blackmun joined with the majorities in both Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972) and Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
144. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2520.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See supra notes 77-104 and accompanying text. Justice Blackmun mentions
one exception to his charge in a footnote. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2521 n.1. Only
Zacchini involved a dispute about the right of publication of certain information. Id.
at 2520-21.
148. Id.
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Justice Blackmun found that Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell
mirrors the issues in Cohen "precisely."' In that case the Court found that
the media defendant's First Amendment rights would be violated by the
imposition of liability under a state claim of infliction of emotional distress,
a law of general applicability.' 5' To succeed under the state law claim, a
plaintiff would have to show that the publication contained a false statement
that was made with actual malice.'
Virginia's interest in protecting its
citizens from emotional distress was subordinated to the First Amendment." 3
In applying Hustler to Cohen, Justice Blackmun found that the enforcement of a promissory estoppel claim against the defendants would have more
than an incidental effect on their speech, because the speech itself is the
violation. 4 Therefore, any liability attached to that publication would
punish the exercise of a First Amendment right in the absence of a state
interest "of the highest order.""55

C. Justice Souter'sDissent"6
Like Justice Blackmun, Justice Souter rejected the doctrine of laws of
general applicability as dispositive in Cohen and instead weighed the interests
of the public, the media, and potentially injured parties. 57
He emphasized that freedom of speech and the press belong to more than
the media. 5 8 He stated that "freedom of the press is ultimately founded on
the value of enhancing such discourse for the sake of a citizenry better
informed and thus more prudently self-governed .... '[i]t is the right of the
[public], not the right of the [media], which is paramount. ' " 159
In Cohen, Justice Souter found that the scale should tip in favor of the
public interest to know about Cohen's activities in support of a political

149. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
150. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2521.
151. Hustler,485 U.S. at 48 (defendant published a satirical critique portraying
the plaintiff, a television evangelist, as having engaged in a "drunken incestuous
rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse.").
152. Id. at 56.
153. Id. at 50.
154. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2521.
155. Id. at 2521-22.
156. Id. at 2522. Justice Souter is joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and
O'Connor. Id.
157. Id. at 2522-23.
158. Id. at 2523.
159. Id. at 2523 (quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981)). For a
discussion of the role of the press, see supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
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candidate." However, Justice Souter wrote that the weighing process could
result in a different outcome under different circumstances, particularly if the
identity of the source were of less public significance.' 6'
V. Comment
After Cohen visited the undisturbed frontier where the First Amendment
clashes with promises of confidentiality to news sources, the Court returned
with a deceivingly straightforward holding that will create inconsistency and
confusion. It is likely to lead to a floodgate of litigation. 6 '
The advisory holding only determined that Cohen could bring a claim of
promissory estoppel in Minnesota state courts without violating the press' First
Amendment rights, if such a claim was otherwise supportable under Minnesota
law. 63 The Court could award no damages to Cohen, nor could it order
injunctive relief.'6 Cohen's success under the state law claim was not
assured. Cohen's knowledge that the court records he provided related to
charges that had been dismissed and vacated indicated he may not have had
the "clean hands"'16 required to obtain equitable relief. If the Court left
Cohen's suit unresolved on the merits and subject to failure under state law,
then what does the Cohen decision signal to the media and its news sources?
The majority in Cohen uses the broad brush of laws of general applicability to paint a simplistic facade over a more complex mural of competing
constitutional, state, and public interests. Specifically, the opinion (1) ignores
the substantial impact on free speech and press; (2) contradicts the holding in
a substantially similar case, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell;'6 and (3)
begs for inconsistent results among the states. This section discusses these
criticisms and an alternative standard and applies it to Cohen.

160. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2523.
161. Id.
162. See supra note 3 for a listing of recent cases involving promises of
confidentiality.
163. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518-19. See supra note 138 for the Minnesota
Supreme Court's analysis of the case on remand.
164. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519-20.
165. "[E]quity will not grant relief to a party, who, as actor, seeks to set judicial
machinery in motion and obtain some remedy, if such party in prior conduct has
violated conscience or good faith or other equitable principle." BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 250 (6th ed. 1990) (cited in Franklin v. Franklin, 283 S.W.2d 483, 486
(Mo. 1955)).

166. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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A. The ChillingEffect on a FreePress
Justice White found that the imposition of civil liability for a breach of
a promise of confidentiality would have only "incidental" and "insignificant"
effects on newsgathering.16 7 He defended against the dissenters by stating
that the press is not singled out in Cohen.16 He stated that this was merely
a consequence of applying to the press a generally applicable law that requires
those who make certain kinds of promises to keep them.169
. In placing the press on the same constitutional plane as other citizens,
Justice White ignored the fact that "normal citizens to whom generally
applicable laws apply are not in the business of information gathering and
delivery."' 70 Because news organizations, unlike other entities, inherently
rely on confidentiality agreements "to achieve the larger societal good of
uncovering scandal, corruption and abuse," the promissory estoppel analysis
in Cohen is in practice only applicable to news organizations."' It is not
generally applicable to everyone, which distinguishes Cohen from the
majority's line of general applicability cases."7 Cohen effectively singles
out the media, even though the Court's analysis sounds "neutral on its
173
face."
One journalist noted that the conclusion in Cohen reveals a disturbing
recent trend in Supreme Court cases in which laws are given minimal scrutiny
1 74
because their impact on constitutional rights appears merely "incidental.
Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent that laws of general applicability can
restrict First Amendment rights just as severely "as those directed specifically
at speech itself."' 75
To avoid litigation, media organizations will need to revamp their policies
on promises of confidentiality. Reporters will probably be stripped of the
absolute authority to make such promises and simultaneously will lose some
of their flexibility in newsgathering. Given the choice between playing it safe
and risking public exposure, sensitive news sources may opt to be quiet.
However, if news sources still perceive apparent authority in reporters to make

167. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Karl Olson & Benjamin A. Holden, An Oath OfSilence: ContractDamages
Come to the InformationIndustry When a Reporter Breaches a Deal With a Source,
THE RECORDER, Oct. 14, 1991, at 8.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. James, supra note 3, at S4.
175. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2522.
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such promises, and if reporters do not dispel that perception, a simple policy
change will probably not shield the media. In the end, media organizations
will have. to scrutinize more closely both the kinds of promises their reporters
make and the professional integrity of the reporters who make them. The
heightened awareness to keeping promises will benefit sources; however, the
press' ability to perform its three traditional roles 76 will be reduced.
Hesistant editors may bow to the greater pressure of threatened civil liability
rather than the duties to inform the public and keep government accountable.
B. Inconsistency with Hustler
The detrimental effect of the imposition of civil liability on First
Amendment rights creates the basis for the Court's opinion in Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.'" Hustler addresses facts and constitutional
issues similar to Cohen but differs in its holding.
In Hustler, the Court found that the media defendant's First Amendment
rights would be violated by the imposition of liability under a state infliction
of emotional distress claim. 78 According to Justice Blackmun's dissent in
Cohen, the Hustler court did not question that the Virginia tort was "'a law
17 9
of general applicability' unrelated to the suppression of speech."'
Virginia's interest in protecting its citizens from emotional distress, however,
was subordinated to the First Amendment.180 The Court held that "when
used to penalize the expression of opinion, the law was subject to the
strictures of the First Amendment."''
To protect the media's First Amendment rights, the Court in Hustler
concluded that "public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications...
without showing in addition that the publication
contains a false statement of
82
fact which was made with 'actual malice.' 0
Despite the protection afforded in Hustler, the majority in Cohen rejected
any imposition of stricter requirements on the plaintiff for proving his claim
of promissory estoppel.'
The Cohen court distinguished Hustler on the

176. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
177. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
178. Id. at 48. See also supra note 149-153 and accompanying text.
179. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2521. To succeed under the state law claim, a plaintiff
would have to show that the publication contained a false statement which was made
with actual malice. Id. See also Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50.
180. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2521; Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50.
181. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2521.
182. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56.
183. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519.
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kind of injury sustained and the theory used.1" Cohen sought compensation
for a breach of promise for which he lost his job, whereas Faiwell claimed
injury to his state of mind. 5 The Court simply seems more comfortable
extending the stricter requirements of a libel and defamation claim to the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress than to promissory estoppel for
a breach of promise.
In reviewing all of the cases discussed in Cohen, only Hustler comes
close to mirroring the facts and constitutional context of Cohen. The
majority's cases supporting the doctrine of laws of general applicability fail
to address the constitutional concerns, while the dissent's First Amendment
protection cases (except for Hustler)deal almost exclusively with criminal, not
civil, liability. Furthermore, the cases have little application when the method
of newsgathering is improper. Hustler addresses the constitutional questions
and deals specifically with imposition of civil liability on the press under a
state law claim. Therefore, the Court in Cohen should have followed Hustler
and protected the press from the promissory estoppel claim with the
imposition of stricter requirements for proving the elements.
C. Potentialfor InconsistentResults
The Cohen court remanded the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court to
decide whether Cohen could prevail on a promissory estoppel theory or if
state law protected the newspaper.' 86 One commentator noted that this
approach "creates the real possibility that the First Amendment will apply to
the States only to the extent that state laws classify a protected speech
interest."'" The danger is that the laws concerning confidentiality agreements will vary from state to state and will depend on each state's supreme
court interpretation, particularly the free speech clause of its state constitution. "
The Cohen majority's laws of general applicability doctrine fails to
address the competing interests of the state, public, and press.'89 One
commentator noted that
it makes every free speech, press and religion case one that distorts these
interests, such that the contours of the First Amendment are constantly

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2520. See supra note 138.
187. James, supra note 3, at S4.
188. Ethan Bronner, Justices Say Sources Can Sue Media; A Broken Vow of
ConfidentialityRuled Actionable, THE BOSTON GLOBE, June 25, 1991, at Al, A8.
189. James, supra note 3, at S4.
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moving. This alone is not a vice-expression is variable and dynamic-but
the generally applicable law exception, ignoring as it does the core First
Amendment concerns because they do not apply, produces results in each
case that redefine the role of the expressive interest without the promise that
the interest will be considered squarely in a future case. 90
The variance among states would be especially vexatious to media
organizations whose operations cross state borders. For example, a newspaper
reporter, circulating in a tri-state area, makes a promise of confidentiality over
the telephone to a source who works in a neighboring state. The source
resides in the third state. The jurisdiction chosen by the aggrieved source
would be crucial to the outcome of the case, because all three states could
have different approaches to breaches of confidentiality agreements. The
newspaper's free speech protection and liability would depend almost entirely
on the source's choice of forum and cause of action.
Television and radio stations, particularly national broadcasters, would
face an even more complex and forbidding task. To decrease the likelihood
of liability, national and regional media organizations may eventually have to
conform their newsgathering techniques to the state whose laws are most
hostile to the press. The media-friendly laws of neighboring states would only
hold significance for media organizations operating entirely within the state.
Commentators are also concerned about the expansion of Cohen to cases
that have a mixture of elements under a breach of promise and libel or
defamation. 191 According to one article, "Unhappy sources and other
potential plaintiffs may try to dress up libel claims as breaches of contract or
promissory estoppel to avoid the constitutional protections and privileges the
press enjoys in libel actions.""
Jane Kirtley, executive director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press, said the Court is "driving a wedge between sources and
reporters" by changing a relationship based on trust to one governed by
contractual arrangements.' 9 She said "the ruling also would draw courts
and lawyer[s] more deeply into [editorial] decisions about using confidential

190. Id.
191. See Olson & Holden, supra note 170, at 8. As an example, a reporter calls
a source who is involved in a public dispute with an official. The reporter wants the
source's side of the story and asks the source to comment so that the reporter can write
a fair and balanced story. The official has already commented extensively. The
source cooperates. The story appears with a disproportionate number of quotes from
the official rather than the source. The scenario includes both a promise and a story
slighting the source. Id.
192. Id.
193. Campbell, supra note 3, at 2.
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sources."'194 "'I predict this decision will create lots of problems for
and then get into
journalists,' said Kirtley. 'Sources who leak information
1 95
trouble will claim they were promised certain things.'
Although Cohen may rightly prod media organizations to be more
responsible newsgatherers, the decision is sure to touch off a powder keg of
litigation in the fifty states.'9
D. Alternative Standard
This section explores an alternative standard to the rule in Cohen to
better serve the competing interests of the press, state and public. The
alternative is a two-prong construct developed by a Minnesota Law Review
commentator.1 97 It focuses on the definity of the alleged confidentiality
agreement
and injects a fault element similar to libel and defamation
8
cases.

19

Under the first prong of the standard, a plaintiff is required to "produce
clear and convincing evidence" that a promise of confidentiality had been
made and that a media organization breached the promise by publishing the
confidential information.' 99 This high standard of proof protects the media's
First Amendment rights by discouraging frivolous suits, especially when the
existence of the promise is hotly disputed. 2°° The second prong of the
standard requires the plaintiff to prove that the media organization breached
the promise with reckless disregard to the plaintiff's interests in the promise.
The prong incorporates the "reckless disregard" standard from New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,201 which established a fault standard for public figure
defamation cases.2
In the context of promises of confidentiality, the reckless disregard
standard differs from New York Times.203 A court should consider (1) the
media organization'sknowledge of why the source wanted confidentiality, (2)
the media organization's reason for publishing the information, and (3) the
newsworthiness of the confidential information. 2°

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Savage, supra note 27, at 1.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See Dicke, supra note 2.
Id. at 1579.
Id.
Id. at 1579-80.
376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
Id. at 279-80.
Dicke, supra note 2, at 1581.
Id.
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The use of the two-prong test strikes a compromise between the
constitutional indifference of strict liability and absolute First Amendment
protection for the press. 2'0 The source's interest in compensation for harm
is mitigated by stricter requirements for proving a claim for breach of a
confidentiality promise.2°6
In applying this standard to Cohen, the first part of the test is satisfied,
because both parties agreed that a confidentiality agreement existed.&7 The
analysis then falls on the second prong.'m Arguably, one could conclude
that both parties in Cohen have strong arguments under the three considerations outlined above. ° The newspaper reporters and editors naturally
realized that Cohen wanted confidentiality to avoid damage to his standing in
the community, particularly at his work place. However, Cohen's high
visibility in the community made his involvement newsworthy, especially in
the context of a political campaign. Further, Cohen's confidential report
withheld crucial details about the disposition of the charges against Johnson.
Cohen argued that the newspapers could have informed the public sufficiently
by identifying him as a "Republican party activist." 210 Unfortunately,
applying this test to the facts in Cohen results in an ambiguous conclusion.
The test is only slightly more helpful than the Court's rationale.
Although the commentator in the Minnesota Law Review outlines more
concrete criteria for cases in which a promise of confidentiality is breached,
the alternative standard does not adequately replace the protections of free
speech and press offered by the First Amendment.2
The standard merely
interjects an additional element and toughens the level of proof required for
the imposition of liability on media organizations.
Both the majority in Cohen and the standard above ignore a concern that
is fundamental to the First Amendment. The importance of the First
Amendment springs from its protection of speech that might be suppressed if
it is onerous to the government or the majority. 1 While breaking promises
is generally disfavored in this society, to compromise the protection of the
First Amendment as a remedy is to bow to the very pressure from which the
authors of the amendment sought to isolate the press.

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 1582.
Id.
Id. at 1584.
Id.
Id. at 1584-85.
Id. at 1585.

211. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
212. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.7,

at 940-41 (4th ed. 1991).
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The Court could have relied on its earlier decision in Hustler213 to find
in favor of the publishers or at least to establish a standard that could be
applied uniformly to subsequent cases. If applied to Cohen, the Hustler
opinion would (1) subordinate state law claims, such as promissory estoppel,
to the First Amendment when the law penalized freedom of expression and (2)
interject a heightened burden of proof on public figures. The heightened
burden, involving proof of actual malice, would be similar to the standard
proposed by other commentators; 214 however, by adopting Hustler as
controlling authority, the Court could avoid the chilling effect of Cohen and
prevent the inevitable cries for the Court to concoct a new standard specifically for breaches of confidentiality promises.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cohen assumes a peculiar position among the cases involving media

defendants. Because of the Court's failure to recognize the special role of
confidentiality promises in traditional press activity, the Court has cast itself
into the position of second-guessing editorial decisions when news sources
become disgruntled. This decision smacks of inadvertent judicial activism in
a Supreme Court that many claim has entered a new era of conservatism.
Despite the constitutional indifference of Cohen and its propensity to
foster inconsistent results, the opinion rightfully encourages the media to take
more seriously its confidentiality agreements. Because a lawsuit for a breach
of promise can only compensate a party for an injury already incurred, the
reliability of these promises ultimately rests in the professional ethics expected
of reporters, editors, and the media in general.215 Unless the media can
assure sources confidentiality when requested and adhere to those obligations,
sources may simply choose to disappear. 1 6
HAROLD B. OAKLEY

213. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
214. See Dicke, supra note 2.

215. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199,202 (Minn. 1990), rev'd, 111
S. Ct. 2513 (1991).

216. Id. at 202-03.
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